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Abstract
Recent studies on the history of economic development demonstrate that con-
centration of power on a monarch or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth
and that institutional changes that diffuse power, though beneficial to the society
in general, are opposed by some social groups. In November 2005, Kenyans re-
jected a proposed constitution primarily because it did not reduce the powers of
the executive to any significant degree. Using data of voting patterns in the con-
stitutional referendum and following the rational choice framework, I estimate
a model of the demand for power diffusion and demonstrate that groups voting
decisions depend on expected gains and likelihood of monopolizing power. The
results also reveal the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power diffu-
sion process, and therefore the study establishes a channel through which ethnic
fragmentation impacts on economic development.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72
1 Introduction
One of the most significant advances in the economic literature during the last
few decades has been theoretical and empirical insights on the role of institutions
in the development process. Earlier work by North (1981); North and Thomas
(1973); North and Weingast (1989); and Olson (1965), (1982; among others, high-
light the importance of institutions such as secure property rights and the quality
of governance in providing the right economic incentives for capital accumula-
tion and economic growth. Recent work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a)and
(2000b), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and (2005), stress the impor-
tance of institutions and especially constraints on the executive-or what Powellson
(1994) refers to diffusion of power-as central to the emergence of conditions that
are conducive to economic growth. Acemoglu and his colleagues provide evidence
showing that concentration of power on a monarch or a ruling coalition acts as
a barrier to economic growth (see also Olson 1993 and 1997). The power dif-
fusion process varies across countries and to an extent depends on the leverage
that excluded groups have to influence change (Powellson 1994). The capacity
of the disfranchised groups to leverage institutional change is therefore crucial to
economic development.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) suggest that institutional change,
such as one that places constraints on the executive, even though beneficial to so-
ciety in general, will be resisted by those social groups that stand to lose economic
rents or political power. In a society where power is concentrated, various groups
differ in their preferences for institutional change, with those already enjoying
benefits from concentration of power preferring the status quo. I test this theory
using voting of the 2005 constitutional referendum in Kenya. Kenya is a typical
African country and although it has escaped military rule and civil war that have
been pervasive in most of Africa, it has been characterized by a high concentration
of power in the executive. For many years, Kenyans agitated for constitutional
change that would reduce the powers of the executive but then President Moi’s
government frustrated the process and prevented the timely adoption of a demo-
cratic constitution.
In December 2002, Kenyans elected a coalition government with Mwai Kibaki
as President bringing to an end 40 years rule by the Kenya African National
Union (KANU) that hitherto dominated politics since independence. The rejec-
tion of KANU was culmination of many years of frustration with leadership that
was characterized by nepotism, corruption, poor economic management and wide-
spread violation of human rights. Misrule under the KANU regime was attributed
primarily to a national constitution that endowed too much power on the executive
and the almost complete absence of separation of powers between the branches of
government. Presidents Moi and Kenyatta before him used the executive pow-
ers to marginalize some ethnic groups and redistribute the countries resources to
reward political support thereby exacerbating regional and ethnic disparities and
also undermining production incentives (see for example Odhiambo 2004). As
a demonstration of commitment to advancing democracy in the country, Presi-
dent Kibaki in his inaugural speech promised that a new constitution would be
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completed within 100 days.
The process of preparing a new constitution had been on-going for several years
but a draft constitution was not completed until late in 2005. The delay in final-
izing the constitution making process was primarily because of what were referred
to as ”contentious” issues that mainly revolved around the distribution of power
between the Executive and the Legislature. The draft constitution was subjected
to a national referendum in November 2005 and overwhelmingly rejected by vot-
ers. The primary reason given by opponents was that the proposed constitution
still provided the Executive with excessive powers much like the constitution it
was meant to replace. The majority of voters instead favored a system where
substantial powers would be devolved to the legislature with an executive prime
minister as head of the government. Thus, the majority of voters considered the
proposed constitution deficient for failing to deal with the most important issue
of constraining executive power.
Although the proposed constitution was rejected by the Majority of voters,
the voting patterns varied widely across the country. Such patterns suggest dif-
ferences in the perceived benefits and costs associated with adoption or rejection
of the new constitution across the country’s 210 parliamentary constituencies.
The constitutional referendum voting data and the availability of reasonably good
economic and demographic information provide a rare opportunity to evaluate the
demand for power diffusion in a developing country setting. Using a rational choice
framework, I present results that are consistent to the theoretical proposition that
power diffusion is opposed by those who benefit from concentration of power. I
demonstrate that a primary barrier to power diffusion are ethnic interests and
therefore establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation impacts on eco-
nomic growth-namely by slowing the power diffusion process. Section II provides
highlights of the voting patterns and then outlines a simple model of constitu-
tional choice. Section III outlines the empirical model and results, and Section IV
concludes.
2 Demand for Power Diffusion Through Consti-
tutional Choice
2.1 Voting Patterns
Referendums, or what is referred to as direct democracy, are being used with in-
creasing frequency around the world to decide on important public policy issues
(Deacon and Shapiro 1975, Matsusaka 1992; Butler and Austin 1994, Fidrmuc
1998; Coate and Conlin 2004). Of particular interest is the use of referendums in
deciding on national constitutions or even regional integration (Clarke and Korn-
berg 1994, Remmer and Gelineau 2003, and Vlachos 2005). Developing countries
undergoing democratic transitions are increasing using referendums to decide on
constitutions. In 2005, Kenyans voted in a constitutional referendum where they
were asked to accept or reject a proposed constitution which if approved by the
majority of the voters would have replaced the current constitution. Our focus
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is on the determinants of the voter choice for a new constitution and we start by
looking at the voting patterns for the proposed constitution across the country
and by regions and population groups.
Kenya is divided into 8 main administrative regions known as Provinces which
are subdivided into 70 sub units called districts.1 Except for Nairobi Province
which is fairly ethnically heterogeneous, other provinces are dominated by par-
ticular ethnic groups and though not completely homogenous, are comprised of
closely related groups in terms of language and customs. Districts are on the
other hand fairly homogenous both in terms of ethnicity, population characteris-
tics and economic activities. Representation in the national Parliament is based
on sub units of the districts known as Constituencies. There are presently 210
Parliamentary constituencies that are largely homogenous in terms of ethnicity
and other dimensions.
Table 1 provides summary information on the constitutional referendum voting
results for the entire country and by provinces, districts and main ethnic group-
ings. While the proportion approving the proposed constitution nationally was
38 percent this figure was 93.28 percent in Central Province and only 15.04 per-
cent in Nyanza Province. Likewise, there is a wide variation across the districts
with support ranging from 98.39 percent in Nyeri District to only 0.68 percent in
Rachuonyo District. Similar differences in support of the constitution are evident
across ethnic groups for example with 93.28 percent of Kikuyu’s, and only 1.43
percent of Luos supporting the proposed constitution.
Another interesting aspect of the data is the wide differences in the voter
turnout. Turnout nationally was nearly 60 percent, but only 27.26 percent in
North Eastern Province and as high as 71.86 percent in the Rift Valley Province.
Voter turnout across the districts range from a low of 24.7 percent in Mandera
District, to a high of 84 percent in Migori District. For ethnic groups, turnout
was highest among the Kikuyus (72.18 percent) and lowest among the Mji Kenda
group (40.48 percent).2 The last column in Table 1 looks at the voter intensity-
measured as the percentage of voter turnout in the referendum (2005) compared
to the voter turnout in the general elections (2002).3 While the referendum and
the general election were held in different years, the relative turnout is a good
proximate indicator of how strongly voters felt about the referendum. Although
nationally voter intensity is just about the same for both the referendum and
general election (100.49 percent), the data shows a wide variation in voter intensity
across provinces, districts and ethnic groups.
Overall, the data on the constitutional referendum voting patterns reveals im-
1Nairobi province is not sub-divided into districts. That is, there is only one district also
known as Nairobi.
2Turnout normally does vary because of the cost of voting (e.g. differences in distances to
polling stations, weather, etc). For our current study, we do not focus on the differences in
turnout but we do capture turnout through a voter intensity variable.
3Voter intensity is simply computed as (voter turnout-Referendum /voter turnout General
Election)*100. Voter intensity equal to 100 means that the referendum was considered just as
important as the general election in a particular constituency assuming that costs of voting
did not change between the two events, or if there were changes, they were uniform across the
country.
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Table 1: Constitutional Referendum Voting Patterns
Unit Constituencies Percent YES Turnout Intensity
National 210 38.0 59.4 100.49
PROVINCE
Nairobi 8 43.35 42.33 98.67
Coast 21 20.65 41.00 88.68
Northeastern 11 25.4 27.26 46.35
Eastern 36 47.33 60.20 97.31
Central Province 29 93.28 72.18 107.24
Rift Valley 49 22.92 71.86 115.98
Western 24 37.81 50.36 90.97
Nyanza Province 32 15.04 61.57 108.71
DISTRICT
1. Nairobi 8 43.5 42.33 98.67
2 Mombasa 4 20.85 29.92 89.24
3. Kwale 3 12.41 43.42 91.48
4. Kilifi 3 14.59 37.52 87.72
5. Malindi 2 11.56 37.60 89.28
6. Tana River 3 15.43 44.25 81.79
7. Lamu 2 34.67 49.13 81.89
8. Taita 4 32.62 48.09 95.00
9. Garissa 4 12.68 27.16 50.15
10. Wajir 4 28.00 24.71 40.87
11. Mandera 3 39.00 30.81 48.58
12. Moyale 1 47.36 42.14 64.80
13. Marasbit 3 26.21 46.60 73.32
14. Isolo 2 40.95 48.32 75.94
15. Meru North 4 84.06 80.71 124.41
16. Meru Central 3 95.70 68.08 101.32
17. Meru South 1 94.93 66.41 95.27
18. Tharaka 1 86.21 69.39 94.94
19. Embu 2 94.59 64.58 100.70
20. Mbeere 2 77.18 58.99 89.64
21 Mwingi 2 14.90 65.43 103.13
22. Kitui 4 28.00 50.36 88.30
23. Machakos 6 11.71 57.93 102.06
24. Makueni 5 25.16 59.77 104.41
25. Nyandarua 4 96.14 77.35 112.96
26. Nyeri 6 98.39 76.53 107.25
27. Kirinyaga 4 96.96 80.25 110.03
28. Muranga 3 96.85 70.22 106.79
29. Maragwa 3 97.32 72.80 112.78
30. Thika 4 79.86 61.05 98.40
31. Kiambu 5 88.12 66.11 104.41
32. Turkana 3 26.04 31.96 71.69
33. West Pokot 3 4.36 68.45 124.07
34. Samburu 2 9.70 59.55 108.30
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Table 1 (cont): Constitutional Referendum Voting Patterns
Unit Constituencies Percent YES Turnout Intensity
DISTRICT
35. Trans Nzoia 3 55.15 53.27 92.56
36. Usian Gishu 3 16.33 74.21 123.70
37. Marakwet 2 1.69 99.01 148.33
38. Keiyo 2 1.73 87.43 127.83
39. Nandi North 2 6.44 78.42 115.90
40. Nandi South 2 8.45 76.22 120.37
41. Baringo 3 18.61 77.97 101.22
42. Koibatek 2 9.05 96.16 135.16
43. Laikipia 2 83.61 64.88 106.52
44. Nakuru 6 62.35 65.98 114.97
45. Trans Mara 1 7.00 73.12 113.11
46. Narok 2 6.90 78.33 116.75
47. Kajiado 3 29.20 65.25 103.94
48. Bomet 3 2.92 84.14 130.90
49. Bureti 2 2.92 83.94 141.38
50. Kericho 3 7.76 79.54 126.71
51. Kakamega 4 38.10 49.78 83.71
52. Lugari 1 13.19 31.13 137.49
53. Butere Mumias 4 29.60 47.88 87.34
54. Vihiga 4 16.88 45.72 85.94
55. Mt. Elgon 1 22.28 75.27 113.90
56. Bungoma 5 80.93 51.57 84.91
57. Teso 1 4.89 65.11 107.40
58. Busia 4 31.04 51.44 83.00
59. Siaya 3 1.14 57.09 117.48
60. Bondo 2 2.76 70.22 122.96
61. Kisumu 3 2.48 54.92 107.31
62. Nyando 3 1.32 66.79 115.97
63. Rachuonyo 2 0.68 78.50 133.44
64. Homa Bay 2 0.76 72.34 132.00
65. Migori 4 1.01 84.03 144.83
66. Suba 2 1.32 72.79 132.53
67. Kuria 1 31.01 61.84 97.71
68. Gucha 3 41.07 44.44 71.70
69. Kisii 5 41.26 43.84 73.15
70. Nyamira 2 45.49 27.85 78.30
1. Kikuyu 93.28 72.18 107.24
2. Embu 83.38 61.83 94.50
3. Meru 90.79 72.45 109.90
4. Luhya 37.81 50.34 90.97
5. Luo 1.43 69.19 125.18
6. Kalejin 16.13 70.78 113.47
7. Kamba 19.87 57.57 99.64
8. Kisii 42.05 44.82 73.75
9. Mji Kenda 19.09 40.48 81.28
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portance of regionalism and ethnicity in supporting or rejecting the proposed con-
stitution. Likewise, turnout and voter intensity vary across regions and ethnic
groups. The data therefore suggests wide variations in the demand for institu-
tional change across regions and ethnic groups. Our interest in this paper is on
the determinants of voter choice in the constitutional referendum.
2.2 Model of Constitutional Choice
The evaluation by the majority of voters was that the proposed constitution still
concentrated powers and therefore its adoption would not have resulted in gains
to disfranchised groups.4 Thus, those who voted against the adoption of the con-
stitution were in fact expressing a demand for power diffusion while those who
supported the constitution are those who preferred a system that concentrated
powers.5 The data presented in Table 1 therefore reveals differences in the de-
mand for power diffusion. Simply, the patterns reflect differences in the expected
gains and losses associated with adoption or rejection of the constitution across
the various groups and regions.6 To model citizen’s decisions to vote in the con-
stitutional referendum, we assume that the country is represented by voters who
share a utility function of the following general form:
UI(qi, gi) (1)
Where (qi is private consumption, gi is consumption of publicly provided goods
and services and I is an index of institutional arrangements. Citizens first make
a decision to participate in the referendum (pi = 1) and then make a decision to
either vote ”YES” (v = 1) or ”NO” (v = 0). Voters face a cost pi of participating in
the referendum. The probability of an individual voting ”yes” or ”no” is assumed
to depend on the expected benefits from institutional change relative to the status
quo such that v = 1 if
UI=0(qi, gi, pi) < UI=1(qi, gi, pi) (2)
and v = 0 if
UI=0(qi, gi, pi) > UI=1(qi, gi, pi) (3)
4This information is also confirmed by exit polling data obtained from the media and public
opinion polling firms.
5This view was well articulated during the referendum campaign. The Electrol Commission
of Kenya assigned fruit symbols–Banana for ”Yes” and Oranges for ”No,” and in a cleverly
crafted advertisement, those opposed to the draft emphasized the point of concentration of
power by comparing bananas (all bunched together) and oranges (widely distributed in the
various branches of the orange tree.
6Although we focus on the most debated issue of concentration of power, from a constitu-
tional economics perspective, the draft constitution had many other serious flaws for example,
by including largely economic guarantees that are cannot be achieved by any country. A con-
cern is that inclusion of economic rights that are not enforceable or even achievable weakens a
constitution and make it ambiguous (See Kimenyi 2006c). Unfortunately, neither opponents nor
supporters of the draft constitution debated the ”economic rights” aspects of the constitution
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Where I = 0 denotes the status quo and I = 1 denotes the post- referendum
institutional change.7 For simplicity, we assume that the cost of voting (pi) is
uniform across opponents and supporters in a given electrol area. This allows us
to ignore variations in participation rates and only focus on the voter choices.8
The probability of a ”yes” or ”no” vote is assumed to be influenced by a vector
of variables (Xi) that proxy wellbeing and other factors such as region or group
that the voter i belongs to and can be expressed by the cumulative logistic function
as follows:
Vi =
1
e−(α+βXi)
(4)
The data available does not permit us to estimate individual voting behavior
as we only observe the aggregate voting data. Group data are available for the 210
constituencies for the share of ”Yes” and ”No” votes and also average data on other
variables that characterize the constituencies. If we assume that each individual’s
vote is independent, then aggregate voting behavior can be approximated by:
ln(
Vc
1− Vc ) = αg + βgX + µg (5)
Where Vc is the proportion voting ”Yes” in constituency C and αg and βg are
the coefficients based on group data for each of the constituencies, and ug is the
error term. Given the assumptions made, the estimated regression coefficients can
be interpreted as parameters underlying the utility function of a representative
voter i in constituency C.
3 Empirical Model and Results
3.1 Estimation Strategy
Equation (5) forms the basis of the empirical model that describes voting behavior
in the referendum. In addition to the measures of the state of the economy and
social provision, we expect voting behavior to be influenced by representative
characteristics that may associate with benefits or costs of concentration of power.
Recent literature shows that ethnic diversity is an important feature that impacts
on development outcomes (Alesina et al. (1999); Easterly and Levine 1997; Collier
2000). Within the context of diffusion of power, ethnic groups could impact on
development outcomes because tension between groups lowers their capacity to
leverage institutional change. In other words, ethnic diversity could increase the
7The assumption is that voters compare the present value of benefits when I = 0 versus when
I = 1. Actually, the voters could reject the constitution even when UI=0 < UI=1 if they consider
that there is a feasible constitutional arrangements that would associate with much larger stream
of benefits.
8There are reports that politicians and well endowed businessmen invested heavily to influence
the voters. Such expenditures could lower the cost of voting for example if voters are provided
with free transport or funds to pay for fare. Both opponents and supporters are said to have
spent large amount of resources but we are not able to capture such expenditures and any effect
that they might have had.
8
costs of cooperation against a ruling coalition.9 We would expect members of
different ethnic groups to oppose or support institutional change depending on
the perceived benefits and costs to their group.
I specify a regression model of the determinants of voting in the constitutional
referendum as follows;
Ln(PYV) = ECONOMY + SOCIAL PROVISION + REPRESENTATIVE +
INTENSITY + REGION ETHNICITY + U
Where:
PY V = Percentage of ”YES” votes (Constituency, 2005);
ECONOMY
Poverty = Poverty rate (District- 1997);
Unemployment = Rate of unemployment (District-2000)
SOCIAL PROVISION
Piped Water = Percentage of households with piped water (District-2000);
Secondary School = Gross enrollment rate in secondary schools (District-2003);
REPRESENATIVE
Cabinet = Representative is Minister or Assistant Minister (Constituency-2005);
Opposition = Representative is a member of the opposition (Constituency-2005);
VOTER INTENSITY = Ratio of voter turnout for the the referendum (2005)
to the turnout during the general election (2002-Constituency);
REGION = Main administrative divisions (Provinces-2005);
ETHNICITY = Ethnic groups (Constituency-2005);
µ = error term.
As noted previously, the draft constitution was rejected by majority of voters
primarily because it did not reflect real change in as far as concentration of power
was concerned. Voting ”no” in the referendum can therefore be interpreted as a
vote for change while ”yes” means resistant to change in favor of the status quo.
Economic well-being is proxied by poverty and unemployment rates. If we
take it that economic status in a constituency reflect cumulative outcomes of past
policies, then higher poverty and unemployment rates would associate with lower
probability of approving the proposed constitution if voters do not believe that it
offers substantial change. Likewise, the quality of social provision as captured by
the proportion of households with piped water and gross secondary school enroll-
ment rates should associate with higher probability of approving the constitution
9Kimenyi (2006b) argues that the failure of states to adopt pro-poor growth policies is due
to the concentration of power and argues that ethnic fragmentation weakens cooperation across
groups and thus reduces the leverage that excluded have to force diffusion of power.
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if voters believe that the proposed constitution would not erode their advanta-
geous position. On the other hand, where provision is poor, voters would oppose
the adoption of a constitution that does not radically depart from the status quo.
Constituencies represented by members of the cabinet can be expected to sup-
port the proposed constitution while those in the opposition are more likely to
oppose the constitution. Simply, being in the cabinet increases the probability of
constituents benefiting from the concentration of power while those constituencies
represented by members of the opposition parties are likely to benefit less from
concentration of power. Voter intensity is included to capture the value placed
by opponents and supporters on the referendum outcomes while REGION and
ETHNICITY capture regional and ethnic fixed effects.
3.2 Data
The preferred unit of analysis is the constituency for which we have good data
on voter choice (Yes or No), turnout, dominant ethnic groups and also represen-
tative member characteristics (whether in cabinet or opposition). However, the
most reliable other data for measures of state of the economy (unemployment
and poverty) and level of social provision (piped water, gross secondary school
enrollment rates) are only available at the district level. I therefore use district
average data for these variables. Although this introduces some noise, constituen-
cies within the same district are fairly similar and we do not expect serious biases.
Likewise, data for these measures are not available for year 2005 when voting in
the referendum took place and are only available for various years between 1997
and 2003.
The choice of measures is largely influenced by data availability and also their
perceived importance to voters. During the preparation of planning documents
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2000) and the Economic Recovery
Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003), consultations were held
across the countries to identify what citizens considered as developmental priori-
ties. As can be expected, these priorities varied across the regions. Nevertheless,
education (primary and secondary), infrastructure (roads and water) were pri-
oritized in all the regions. A good measure of the level of education across the
constituencies is primary school enrollment. However, a policy of free (and largely
compulsory) primary education was introduced in 2003 and therefore this would
not be a good variable to measure differences in provision. Data on road in-
frastructure is rather poor and although data on road density are available, it is
not possible to infer as to the quality of the roads. The proportion of households
with piped water is easier to measure and also reflects what may be referred to
as ”patronage” goods whose benefits only accrue to limited number of groups as
opposed to broader public goods. As will be shown later, piped water is also a
good indicator of the level of infrastructure provision generally.
No constituency is inhabited exclusively by a single ethnic group but most con-
stituencies are dominated by a particular group. For this paper, ethnicity denotes
the dominant ethnic group in a particular constituency. Although there are over
30 ethnic groups in Kenya, many are fairly small and in this study we focus only
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on the larger groups which include the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru, Luhya, Luo, Kamba,
Kalejin, Kisii, and Mji Kenda. The Gikuyu-Embu-Meru ethnic groups–commonly
refereed to as ”GEMA” have strong ties and exhibit similar voting patterns and
for all practical purposes they are considered as one group.10 In this paper, we
therefore classify GEMA as one group. Mji Kenda is actually a general term for
several closely related and small ethnic groups in the Coast Province. Although
not completely homogenous, their voting patterns are fairly uniform. The urban
towns of Nairobi and Mombasa are however fairly ethnically heterogeneous and
we are not able to assign particular ethnic groups to constituencies in those towns.
This is also true for North Eastern Province which is inhabited by many small
groups (many with a nomadic lifestyle) and data are not available to accurately
identify dominant groups in these areas by constituency and therefore ethnicity is
defined as ”others”.11
Voting data (General Election 2002 and Referendum 2005) are as officially
reported by the Electrol Commission of Kenya (ECK). All other data are from
reports by the Government of Kenya, Central Bureau of Statistics including the
Welfare Monitoring Survey, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey and The Economic
Survey . Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
estimation.12
3.3 Results and Analysis
Tables 3 and 4 report results of various specifications of the general model. Both
tables include measures of the state of the economy (poverty rate and unemploy-
ment rate), indicators of levels of social provision (share of households with piped
water and secondary school enrollment rates) and other controls such as, represen-
tative characteristics (whether member of cabinet or if member of an opposition
party), voter intensity which captures how strongly voters feel about the proposed
constitution and also regional fixed effects. Table 4 also controls for ethnic groups.
For the estimations presented, Central province is the excluded region and GEMA
is the excluded ethnic group. Central Province and the GEMA group voted over-
whelmingly in support of the constitution.
The results are largely consistent in most of the specifications shown in Table
3.13 Both measures of the state of the economy-unemployment and poverty as-
sociate with lower proportion of those supporting the proposed constitution but
10GEMA is an acronym for the now defunct Gikuyu-Embu-Meru Association-a voluntary tribal
association that also had extensive business interests and substantial political influence especially
during President Kenyatta’s era.
11In actual fact, many ethnic groups are not 100 percent homogenous and are instead a con-
glomeration of many clans that consider themselves different, For example, the group we refer
to as Luhya is fairly fragmented and often different clans exhibit divergent voting patterns.
12Note that the summary statistics shown are based on the constituencies. Regional and
ethnic statistics therefore reflect share of constituencies per province and share of constituencies
where ethnic groups are dominant, respectively. Thus the ethnic data shown does not represent
population shares.
13In the Tables that follow, t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficients. Asterisks
denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*). Central Province is the
omitted region in Table 3 and 4; and GEMA is the omitted ethnic group in Table 4
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Percent Voting ”Yes” 38.00 34.29
Poverty Rate 54.98 13.22
Unemployment Rate 9.60 4.73
Percent with Piped Water 24.59 23.17
Secondary School Enrollment 22.02 14.78
Member of Cabinet 0.33 0.69
Member of Opposition 0.40 0.49
Voter Intensity 100.49 24.65
Eastern province 0.17 0.38
Coast Province 0.10 0.30
Nyanza Province 0.15 0.36
Western Province 0.11 0.31
North Eastern Province 0.05 0.22
Nairobi Province 0.04 0.19
Central Province 0.14 0.34
Rift Valley Province 0.23 0.42
GEMA 0.21 0.41
Luhya 0.11 0.32
Luo 0.12 0.33
Kalejin 0.19 0.39
Kamba 0.08 0.27
Kisii 0.05 0.21
Mji Kenda 0.10 0.30
Other 0.10 0.31
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unemployment rate is not statistically significant in some of the specifications (Ta-
ble 3). The results suggest that voters are concerned about their current economic
status when voting on constitutional change. The fact that voters in areas that
are more economically depressed as evidenced by high poverty and unemployment
rates are more opposed to the proposed constitution suggest that they did not
see much change in the proposed constitution. Simply, if voters attribute their
economic well-being to weaknesses in a constitution, they will reject proposed
changes if they do not reflect a significant departure from the old constitution.
The variables are not statistically significant when ethnicity is controlled for (Ta-
ble 4). This could be due to the fact that poverty and unemployment rates vary
systematically by ethnic groups as a result of the spatial concentration of ethnic
groups in particular areas.
We use the proportion of households with piped water and gross secondary
school enrollment as measures of social provision. As observed, both provision of
education and water are highly valued across the country and voters are likely to
make decisions about approving or opposing the proposed constitution depending
on how well they have been served under existing constitution. Although secondary
school enrollments do capture differences across districts, education provision is
such that a sizeable number of students study outside their home districts and
thus enrollments are not a good indicator of provision to specific groups and re-
gions. Nevertheless, the variation in enrollments could be influenced by ability to
pay in a particular region. We consider piped water to be the most important
proxy for level of social provision. First, its benefits are concentrated to particu-
lar communities-hence a good indicator patronage that comes with concentration
of power. Second, simple data analysis reveal that the percentage of households
with piped water is highly correlated to other infrastructure such as electricity and
telephone density. In other words, areas that have piped water are also likely to
benefit from other infrastructure.14 The different levels of social provision across
the country is primarily attributed to discriminative allocation of resources by the
government which is possible because of the excessive powers of the executive.
Voters in regions that have been marginalized by past governments in terms of
social provision would only support a new constitution if it promises to curtail the
powers of the executive substantially.
The signs on the coefficients for these variables are as hypothesized. The
proportion of households with piped water is highly significant in all specifications.
Given the high correlation between this variable and other forms of infrastructure
suggest that level of provision is an important determinant of constitutional choice.
Secondary school enrollment is only significant in some of the specifications.
Representative characteristics (cabinet member or being in the opposition) are
not important determinants of constitutional choice. The interpretation is that
voters are not myopic but instead are concerned about the longer-term implications
of a constitution.15
14It is of course possible that high potential, high income regions are well served with infrastruc-
ture because of effective demand (people have still to pay for services). This is true-however, the
services are provided by the government and such depends on political decisions.
15The results could also reflect the fact that the ruling party ”NARC” is a fairly loose coalition
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Table 3: Regression results for the Determinants of Constitutional
Choice (N=210. Dependent Variable = log(Percentage Voting Yes)
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept 5.080*** 2.656*** 2.539*** 18.258*** 20.543**
(11.50) (4.53) (4.22) (11.04) (12.06)
Poverty -0.033*** -0.014* -0.013* -0.025*** -0.020
(-4.60) (-1.93) (-1.84) (-4.02) -(-2.57)
Unemployment -0.37* -0.004 -0.001 -0.088*** -0.072***
(-1.83) (-0.20) (-0.08) -(4.49) (-3.87)
Piped water 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.0019***
(4.93) (4.70) (6.09) (4.75)
Secondary School .026*** 0.026*** .020*** -0.000
(3.87) (3.86) (3.62) (-0.09)
Cabinet 0.224 0.132 0.000
(0.94) (0.68) (0.00)
Opposition -0.071 -0.058 -0.064
(-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.44)
Voter Intensity -3.083*** -3.352***
(-9.96) (-(9.74)
North Eastern Province -2.144***
(-3.82)
Eastern Province -0.182
(-0.54)
Coast Province -1.254***
(-3.54)
Nyanza Province -2.-13***
(-6.40)
Western province -0.825**
(-2.48)
Rift Valley Province -1.006***
(-3.40)
Nairobi Province -1.573***
(-3.08)
Adjusted R-Square 0.098 0.224 0.219 0.474 0.629
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Table 4: Regression results for the Determinants of Constitutional
Choice (N=210. Dependent Variable = log(Percentage Voting Yes)
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept 4.354*** 3.295*** 3.299*** 14.718*** 12.508**
(13.61) (6.99) (6.77) (8.65) (7.64)
Poverty -0.000 -0.051 0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(-0.15) (-0.85) (-0.87) (-1.05) -(-1.09)
Unemployment 0.017 0.018 0.017 -0.034* -0.013
(1.01) (1.02) (1.01) (-1.95) (-0.82)
Piped water 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007**
(3.56 (3.55) (3.80) (2.24)
Secondary School .011* 0.011* .003 0.006
(1.76) (1.78) (0.05) (1.04)
Cabinet -0.031 -0.046 0.018
(-0.19) (-0.31) (0.14)
Opposition -0.073 -0.10 -0.065
(-0.41) (-0.06) (-0.44)
Voter Intensity -2.208*** -1.778***
(-6.94) (-(5.60)
North Eastern Province
Eastern Province 0.497*
(1.96)
Coast Province -1.457***
(-5.72)
Nyanza Province -2.724***
(-5.66)
Western province -0.460
(-0.56)
Rift Valley Province -0.229
(-0.87)
Nairobi Province -0.648
(-1.48)
Luhya -1.081*** -0.877*** -0.891*** -1.140*** -0.529
(-4.49) (-3.66) (-3.66) (-5.15) (-0.56)
Luo -3.512*** -3.212*** -3.229*** -2.844*** -0.565
(-14.61) (-12.95) (-12.79) (-12.20) (-1.41)
Kalenjin -2.673*** -2.344*** -2.300*** -1.975*** -2.164***
(-12.07) (-10.07) (-8.69) (-8.16) (-6,89)
Kamba -1.813*** -1.747*** -1.756*** -1.361*** -1.917***
(-6.00) (-5.20) (-5.18) (-4.40) (-5.90)
Kisii -0.726** -0.498 -0.448 1.188*** 1.766***
(-2.26) (-1.55) (-1.28) (-3.59) (3.11)
Mji Kenda -1.662*** -1.462*** -1.447*** -1.544***
(-6.06) (-5.34) (-5.20) (-6.17)
Other Ethnic -1.654*** -1.157*** -1.117*** -1.853*** -1.887***
(-5.64) (-3.67) (-3.35) (-5.84) (-6.39)
Adjusted R-Square 0.611 0.633 0.629 0.702 0.763
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Table 5: Regression results for the Determinants of Constitutional
Choice (N=210. Dependent Variable = log(Percentage Voting Yes)
Explanatory Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 21.269*** 21.335*** 19.540*** 19.692
(12.69 (12.90) (11.94) (12.11)
Poverty -0.022** -022*** -0.0123*** -0.024***
(-2.89) (-2.91) (-3.86) (-3.99)
Unemployment -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.069***
(-3.60) (-3.70) (-3.37) -(-3.55)
Piped water 0.162*** 0.163** 0.017*** 0.017***
(3.97) (4.06) (4.85) (5.05)
Secondary School -0.003 -0.003 0.012** 0.013*
(-0.66) (-0.64) (2.17) (2.25)
Cabinet 0.200 0158
(0.12) (0.0.84)
Opposition 0.045 0.125
(0.31) (0.78)
Voter Intensity -3.698*** -3.704*** -3.612*** -3.607***
(-10.50) (-10.58) (-10.92) (-10.96)
Ethnic Share 0.351*** 0.343*** 0.445*** 0.421***
(3.27) (3.31) (3.79) (3.77)
North Eastern Province -1.669* -1.662***
(-2.95) (-2.96)
Eastern Province 0.046 0.048
(0.14) (0.14)
Coast Province -0.845** -0.847**
(-2.30) (-2.32)
Nyanza Province -1.791** -1.793***
(-5.70) (-5.76)
Western province -0.702* -0.715**
(-2.14) (-2.22)
Rift Valley Province -0.795** -0.782**
(-2.69) (-2.72)
Nairobi Province -1.400** -1.414***
(-2.79) (-2.85)
Adjusted R-Square 0.647 0.650 0.507 0.509
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An interesting variable is the measure of voter intensity which has a negative
coefficient and statistically significant in all the specification even when regional
and ethnic controls are included. We make the assumption that the costs of
participating in the general election and in the referendum is the same to a voter (i)
in constituency ( c). Thus, the only reason for differences in participation between
the general election and referendum is purely due to the importance placed on the
referendum relative to the general election. The results suggest that the perceived
welfare loss to opponents from the adoption of the constitution is much greater
than the expected welfare gain by the proponents.
The regional variables show that all provinces were generally less supportive
of the constitution as compared to Central Province. This holds true even when
ethnicity is controlled for except for Eastern province. Likewise, when regional
controls are not included, the results show that all ethnic groups were more op-
posed to the constitution as compared to the GEMA group which overwhelmingly
supported the proposed constitution. However, when regional controls are in-
cluded, only the Kalejin, Kamba and those in the ”other category” were more
opposed to the constitution than the GEMA (Table 4).16 The results show the
importance of regionalism and ethnicity in constitutional choice decisions.17
The results presented above concerning the importance of ethnicity in consti-
tutional choice requires some further analysis in order to unearth why particular
ethnic groups vote the way they do. Monopolizing power in weak states can be
expected to benefit some ethnic groups at the expense of others. It is therefore
reasonable to assume that all ethnic groups would like to monopolize power which
would give rulers discretion to broker transfers from some groups to others.18 We
can hypothesize that the higher the potential for an ethnic group to monopolize
power, the more likely that members of that group would support a constitution
that endows the executive with more powers.
We make the assumption that the probability of monopolizing power is a func-
tion of population size such that the larger the group, the higher its potential to
monopolize power. Although no single ethnic groups can be able to win a clear
majority, the size of a group gives it an advantage in forging a coalition with others.
Simply, larger sizes increase the probability of monopolizing power and we would
therefore expect size to influence constitutional choice. Information is available
on the relative sizes of the various ethnic groups nationally as follows: Gema-0.28;
Luhya-0.14; Luo-0.13; Kalejin-0.12; Kamba-0.11; Kisii-0.06; Mji Kenda- 0.05; and
and there is much internal opposition and in fact the Cabinet was split over the draft constitution.
At the the time of writing this paper,a large segment of the coalition had for all practical purposes
ceased to be in the ruling party.
16The reason that some of the other ethnic groups are no longer significant is primarily because
there is close overlap between ethnic groups and regions that they occupy.
17Post-independence politics in Kenya has been characterized by ethnic voting patterns. Ethnic
divisions became more pronounced since the introduction of competitive party politics in 1992
many political parties organized along ethnic lines emerged. In fact, it is because of such ethnic
divisions within the opposition that made it possible for President Moi to hold on to power in
the 1992 and 1997 general elections.
18This is consistent to the ethnic rent-seeking literature as advanced by Kimenyi and Mbaku,
among others. See for example, Kimenyi 1989; Kimenyi 1998b; Kimenyi and Mbaku 1993, and
Mbaku and Kimenyi 1995).
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other 0.01.
For each of the constituencies, we establish the dominant ethnic group and
assign ethnic shares accordingly. Thus, if GEMA is the dominant ethnic group
in constituency C-1, we assign this constituency an ethnic share of 0.28. If on
the other hand Luo dominate in constituency C-2, then we assign an ethnic share
of 0.13. Note that ethnic shares are based on national population and not share
of population of an ethnic groups in a constituency. The ethnic share variable is
generated by interacting Ethnicity with the share. The assumption is that voters
in each of the constituencies have an idea about the relative size of their group
in the country and thus they know the probability of monopolizing power. The
larger the ethnic share, the higher the probability of supporting the proposed
constitution since it was characterized by concentration of power. Table 5 reports
the results of various specifications of the general model. The results support our
hypothesis that demand for concentration of power increases with the group size.
Simply, smaller groups that have low probabilities of monopolizing power have a
higher demand for diffusion of power.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes voting patterns in the recent constitutional referendum in
Kenya and provides some empirical evidence of the demand for power diffusion.
The study is unique in that it is probably the first to empirically estimate the
determinants of constitutional choice in a developing country setting using the
rational choice framework. Shortcomings of the data notwithstanding, the results
are fairly robust and provide strong support to recent theoretical advances in the
development literature spearheaded by Acemoglu and others concerning resistance
to institutional change and implications for growth. Finally, this study establishes
a channel through which ethnicity can hinder growth. Our results would suggest
that ethnic groups impact on development outcomes by slowing the power diffusion
process.
The results of the voting patterns in the Kenya constitutional referendum point
to the importance of designing institutions that harmonize ethnic claims in divided
societies. Concentration of power in such societies is often used to marginalize some
groups and to provide patronage goods to others. An appropriate institutional
change then must lower benefits of concentration of political power such as through
constitutional decentralization ( see for example proposals by Kimenyi 1987 and
1998a).
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